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BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: ARE
TAIWAN'S TRADING PARTNERS IMPLYING RECOGNITION OF
TAIWANESE STATEHOOD?
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1949 to 1991, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
Republic of China (Taiwan)' were locked in a diplomatic battle over which
would be the internationally recognized representative of China.2 By 1991,
most nations wanting to do business with both would-be Chinas had solved
the recognition problem by extending official recognition3 to the PRC as the
representative of China and carrying on unofficial trade and cultural relations
with Taiwan. These relations, which are still operating today, were
painstakingly crafted in such a way as not to imply recognition of the
government of Taiwan but to amount, nonetheless, to diplomatic relations in
all but name.4 As part of their recognition of the PRC, these nations agreed
also to recognize its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and to regard the issue
of Taiwan's international status as an internal PRC matter.
Recent changes in Taiwan have thrown the continued viability of this
approach into some doubt. Since its founding in 1986, the Democratic
People's Party (DPP), which supports independent statehood for Taiwan, has
become a major force in Taiwanese politics.5 In response to the growing
popularity of the DPP, the ruling Kuomintang or Nationalist Party (KMT)
which has ruled Taiwan since 1949, renounced its historical claim to
sovereignty over all China and unilaterally recognized the PRC in 1991. 6
In 1992, the KMT announced it would seek international recognition of
Taiwan on a par with the PRC as two parts of a divided China, similar to
Korea or pre-reunification Germany.7 This position has allowed it to retain
the goal of eventual reunification with the mainland while co-opting the
DPP's main issue.
1. Taiwan consists of the island of Formosa, the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores), Jinmen
(Quemoy) Island, and Mazu (Matsu) Island, 2 COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS
YEARBOOK 1243 (Thomas F. Bowen & Kelley S. Bowen eds., 1994) [hereinafter YEARBOOK].
2. The term "China" will be used throughout this paper to describe the concept of an entity
which encompasses both the PRC and Taiwan.
3. Recognition is an act intended or calculated to give rise to legal rights and obligations
between states and/or governments. SIR HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW 330 (1947). On recognition of states and governments generally, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-203 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM]; 2 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
574-92 (1969); WILLIAM L. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD 47-56
(1968); BRANIMIR M. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-111 (1984).
4. See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
5. Ross H. Munro, Giving Taipei a Place at the Table, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 116-19.
6. Id. at 117.
7. Id.
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Despite KMT efforts, the DPP has continued to gain momentum. In the
December 1994 elections, a DPP candidate was elected Mayor of Taipei,'
the third most powerful office in Taiwan. 9 Taiwan's first presidential
elections are scheduled for early 1996.10 The DPP has promised that if one
of its candidates wins the presidency, it will hold a referendum on indepen-
dence. "
From its vantage point across the Straits, the PRC sees no difference
between the divided state idea and independence. Both conflict with what it
sees as its sovereign right to rule Taiwan. Beijing has repeatedly vowed that
if Taiwan were to declare independence, it would invade.' 2 This threat is
enhanced by the fact that Deng Xiaoping' is in poor health.' 4  There is
speculation that when he dies, there could be a power struggle in which an
invasion of Taiwan might serve to rally the nation around a new, possibly
less pragmatic, leader. '"
None of Taiwan's major trading partners has yet seriously reexamined
its recognition policy in light of these new developments. Taiwan's trading
partners continue to affirm that Taiwan's international status is the PRC's
internal matter. However, as Taiwan has become more assertive of its desire
for recognition, the conduct of unofficial relations has begun to suggest that
8. Taiwan's Elections: A Fact Sheet, Agence France Presse, Dec. 3, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Presse File [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
9. Taiwan Holds First Free Local Elections, Deutsche Press Agentur, Dec. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
10. Taiwan's Passionate Democrats, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1994, at 31, 32.
11. Eric Ellis, Taiwan: Elections Key to Shape of Independence, Australian Financial
Review, Dec. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUTER File.
12. "[W]e will never sit idle if the Taiwan authorities go in for Taiwanese independence
with support from foreign forces and turbulence breaks out in Taiwan as a result." Lorien
Holland, China Raps U.S. for Taiwan Moves, UPI, Sept. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File. "People on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese. It would be a great
tragedy for all if China's territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be split and its people were
to be drawn into a fratricide." White Paper on Taiwan, Xinhua Overseas News Service, Aug.
31, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, Xinhua File [hereinafter PRC White Paper].
Chinese president, Jiang Zemin told president Clinton at Jakarta in late 1994 that the PRC would
act militarily if Taiwan declares independence. Rone Tempest, Taiwan Elections: Test of
Nationhood, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at A12; Sunny Goh, Independence from China Major
Issue in Taiwan Elections Today, THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 34.
13. Deng Xiaoping is often referred to as the PRC's "paramount" or "preeminent" leader.
Following Mao Zedong's death in 1976, Deng led the PRC out of the confusion and destruction
of the Cultural Revolution and began a series of pragmatic economic and political reforms.
These reforms shifted the PRC's internal focus from class struggle to economic development.
Deng has been the primary force behind the PRC's entry into the world market and its desire
for more trade and contact with the West. Deng no longer holds an official office but he is still
considered the most powerful man in the PRC. LAWRENCE ZIRING & C.I. EUGENE KIM, THE
ASIAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 212-13 (1985). See also CHINA IN THE ERA OF DENG XIAOPING:
A DECADE OF REFORM (Michael Ying-mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh eds., 1993).
14. Deng Visits with Chinese Leaders, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at All. Deng is 90
years old and was last seen in public in February 1994. There are reports that he is critically
ill. He spent the winter of 1994 in Beijing instead of making his customary trip to Shanghai.
Id.
15. Tempest, supra note 12, at A12.
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these nations have chosen to support Taiwanese independence. This growing
discrepancy between words and deeds is the subject of this comment. With
tensions mounting on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, it has become vitally
important for the outside world to decide which side it supports before either
Taipei or Beijing forces the issue. Otherwise, nations like the United States
may have to choose between defending Taiwan and breaking their word to
the PRC, or abandoning Taiwan to its fate in contradiction of their support-
ive actions.
In part II, this comment examines Mainland China's historical relation-
ship to Taiwan and the nature of Taiwan's unofficial relations with its trading
partners. Part III examines the differing perspectives on Taiwan's interna-
tional status, beginning with its objective or de facto status, moving on to the
PRC's view, and ending with the views of the three main political parties in
Taiwan.
In the context of recent trends in Taiwan, part IV examines the extent
to which Taiwan's unofficial relations with its trading partners complicate
relations between Taiwan and China by suggesting a willingness to recognize
Taiwan as a state. First it explains the theory of recognition implied from
conduct. Next it analyzes two particularly troublesome areas, airspace
agreements and arms sales, to determine whether an intent to recognize
Taiwanese statehood may be implied. This comment concludes by recom-
mending that nations involved in unofficial trade relations with Taiwan
decide whether they support Taiwanese statehood or whether they truly
consider Taiwan to be an internal PRC matter and communicate that decision
clearly to both Taiwan and the PRC.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Perspective
The earliest Chinese contact with the island of Formosa dates back
almost 1700 years." The Chinese Empire did not formally incorporate theisland as a province until 1683."7 From 1683 to 1895, Qing dynasty rule
16. The first actual written account of the island, then called "Yizhou" is thought by PRC
scholars to be found in the "seaboard geographic gazetteer" written by Shen Ying in the Three
Kingdoms Period (A.D. 221-280). PRC White Paper, supra note 12. Periodic Chinese
explorations of Formosa continued through the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-617). Id. See generally
JACQUES GERNET, A HISTORY OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION 196 (1985).
17. Prior to that, Chinese contact with Formosa was minimal, though it did have a constant
presence in the Penghu Islands. Taiwan, in 7 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 306-09
(1983). In the mid-twelfth century, the Song dynasty (960-1279) established a military garrison
on Penghu to ward off pirates. Id. at 306. Penghu came under Chinese Imperial administration
in 1225, but Formosa remained unadministered. Id. The Dutch took over both Penghu and
Formosa in 1622. Id. The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) expelled the Dutch from Penghu two
years later but allowed them to stay on the island of Formosa and set up trading posts. Id.
Formosa was a Dutch trading colony for the next 37 years. Id. A Spanish expeditionary force
from Manila established a trading settlement in the northern part of Formosa which lasted from
19951
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of Taiwan was punctuated by sixty-eight popular uprisings." In 1895,
China was defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War and was forced to
sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceding 9 Taiwan to Japan.2' Japanese rule
of the island was extensive 2' and continued until the Japanese were defeated
at the end of World War 11.22
Meanwhile, on the mainland, the Qing dynasty was overthrown in a
revolution which began in 1911 ' In the late 1920s, Chiang Kai-shek, the
commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Army emerged as the
1626 to 1642. Id. at 307.
After the fall of the Ming dynasty, a Ming loyalist named Cheng Ch'eng-kung, who had
successfully held off the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) for many years in the southeast, invaded
Formosa and ousted the Dutch. Id. From 1662 to 1683, Cheng and his successors ruled
Formosa as a last outpost of the Ming dynasty. Id. Over 100,000 mainland Chinese migrated
to Formosa during Cheng rule. Id. The Chengs set up a land cultivation system and traded with
Japan and other Asian countries. Id. They also introduced a Chinese educational system and
built Confucian temples, thus introducing Chinese culture to the island. Id. The Chengs
abdicated power when faced with imminent invasion by the Qing in 1683. Id. See also THE
CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA (Brian Hook ed., 1982); Yu-ming Shaw, Modem History
of Taiwan: An Interpretive Account, in CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 7, 8-11 (Hungdah Chiu
ed., 1979).
18. Shaw, supra note 17, at 15. The uprisings were both the result of a mixture of pro-
Ming sentiment and a revolt against the Qing military suppression of the Taiwanese population.
Id.
19. Cession is the transfer of sovereignty by agreement between the ceding and the
acquiring state. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 327 (3d
ed. 1993). In theory, cession is accomplished voluntarily, without coercion. Id. However, in
actual historical practice cession has often been accomplished at gunpoint. China's "cession"
of Taiwan to Japan via the treaty of Shimonoseki was merely a legal formality that legitimized
Japan's military conquest of Taiwan.
20. Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, Japan-China, art. II, 1 TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA 1894-1919, 18-19 (John V. A. MacMurray, ed.,
1921) (entered into force May 8, 1895) [hereinafter Shimonoseki]. The Chinese on Taiwan
protested bitterly against cession and declared Taiwan a republic in a futile effort to win
international sympathy. Hungdah Chiu, Comments on Ray E. Johnston, Assessing the
International Status of Partitioned Nations: Theories and Findings, in MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF GERMANY, KOREA AND CHINA 36,
38-39 (Hungdah Chiu & Robert Downen eds., 1981) [hereinafter MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW].
21. Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, those Chinese wishing to retain their nationality were
allowed to leave and go to the mainland. Shimonoseki, supra note 16, art. V, at 20. All who
stayed became Japanese subjects in 1897. Id. The Japanese built Shinto shrines, enforced
Japanese modes of dress and the use of the Japanese language. Ian Buruma, Taiwan, in 26
GRANTA 172-73 (Spring 1989). The Japanese built banks, hospitals and schools. Id. In the
schools, Confucian ethics were taught as Japanese ideals. The Japanese developed water supply
and sewage disposal systems and brought gas and electric power to the cities and countryside.
Id. By 1931, there were 2,857 miles of railroad track in Taiwan compared to 9,400 miles in
all of China. Id. By 1934, power stations in Taiwan produced almost as much electricity as
those in China. Id. The first university in Taiwan, now Taiwan National University, was
established by the Japanese in 1927. Id.
22. Buruma, supra note 21, at 173.
23. See, e.g. GERNET, supra note 16, CHINA: SEVENTY YEARS AFTER THE HSIN-HAI
REVOLUTION (Hungdah Chiu & Shao-chuan Leng eds., 1984); FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Robert L. Worden et al. eds., 1988)
[hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY].
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president of the Republic of China.24
Chiang's KMT Party was in power when the Allies returned Taiwan to
the Republic of China in 1945.' At that time, the KMT was preoccupied
with a civil war against its former revolutionary ally, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong.26
The local population of Taiwan rebelled against the reimposition of
Chinese rule and was crushed by the KMT army in February, 1947.27 In
response to the growing success of CCP forces on the mainland, the KMT
declared martial law throughout China in 1948.28
Following defeat by the Communists in 1949, President Chiang Kai-shek
and the KMT government fled to Taiwan and established the "temporary"
capital of China in Taipei.29 The KMT was joined there by an estimated
two million loyalists.30 Martial law under the KMT continued on Taiwan
for the next forty years.3 Support for the communist regime on the
mainland was criminalized, as was support for Taiwanese independence.32
Despite the KMT's defeat and loss of control over the mainland, it
continued to regard itself as the legal government of China.33 Many nations
of the world continued to view the KMT as China's legal government as
24. For an in-depth look at the complex political currents in China during this period, see
C. Martin Wilbur, Nationalist China 1928-1950: An Interpretation, in CHINA: SEVENTY YEARS
AFTER THE HSIN-HAI REVOLUTION, supra note 23, at 2, 2-57.
25. The Cairo Declaration, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 4, 1943, at 393. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and China declared that "[AII the territories Japan has stolen from the
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of
China." (emphasis added). The Allies reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration in the Potsdam
Declaration of July 26, 1945 which limited Japanese sovereignty to Japan. The Potsdam
Declaration, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 29, 1945, at 137. The Soviet Union joined in the
declaration when it declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. MYUNG-KI KIM, THE KOREAN
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (1991). Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declara-
tion when it surrendered on August 15, 1945. Id. at 8. The declaration then became binding
on Japan. Id.
26. In the years following the revolution, the nationalists had trouble consolidating control
over the entire country. The KMT received aid from Soviet military advisors and reorganized
itself along Soviet (Bolshevik) lines. Wilbur, supra note 24, at 4. As the Revolution pro-
gressed, differences arose between those in the KMT who favored social revolution along
Marxist lines and those who merely wanted political change. The Communist faction was
purged from the KMT in 1927. It reorganized as the Chinese Communist Party under Mao's
leadership. Id. at 2-5. See also GERNET, supra note 16, at 624-43.
27. Introduction to Taiwan, in [1994 Binder XIX] Const. Countries World, (Oceana Pub.,
Inc.) xiii (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter
Blaustein & Flanz]. An estimated 20,000 Taiwanese died in what has become known as "2-28"
after the date it began. Id. The KMT did not formally inquire into the event until 1988. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at xiv.
30. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242.
31. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xxiv.
32. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xiv, xv, xvi.
33. Id. at xiv.
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Interestingly, when Japan finally signed a peace treaty officially
returning Taiwan to China in 1952, the treaty was between Japan and the
KMT authorities on Taiwan.35 Taiwan was returned to the Republic of
China even though many states had, by that time, recognized the PRC as the
legitimate government of China.36
In the 1950s the Taiwan Strait was one of the front lines of the Cold
War. 37 The United States supplied Taiwan with aid and arms, and the two
signed a mutual defense pact. 38 The PRC informally allied itself with the
Soviet Union under the rubric of international communism. 39  After the
PRC and the Soviet Union parted ways over ideological differences in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, ° however, good relations with the PRC were
seen by the United States and other Western nations as a way to politically
isolate the Soviet Union and check its perceived aggressive tendencies.4"
By the early 1970s, it had also became apparent to other nations that refusing
recognition to the representative of over 700 million42 people was impracti-
cal.43
Gradually, the CCP on the mainland began to supplant the KMT as the
internationally recognized government of China." As a condition of its
34. U.S. Dept. of State Report on Diplomatic Relations of the Republic of China and the
People's Republic of China, 11 I.L.M. 571 (1972) [hereinafter DOS Report]. As of May 23,
1972, 46 countries recognized the KMT as the legitimate government of China.
35. Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, R.O.C.-Japan, 138 U.N.T.S. 38.
36. The Japanese at that time recognized the KMT government as the legal representative
of China. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148
(1979).
37. DOROTHY AND THOMAS HOOBLER, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 1129-
30 (1981).
38. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.-R.O.C., 6 U.S.T. 433, 248 U.N.T.S. 214
(entered into force Mar. 3, 1955, terminated Jan. 1, 1979).
39. ROSEMARY QUESTED, SINO-RuSSIAN RELATIONS: A SHORT HISTORY 115-29 (1984).
40. Id. at 120.
41. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China and America 1941-1991, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter
1991, at 75.
42. This was China's population in 1971 when the United Nations admitted the People's
Republic of China as a member. Today, China's population numbers well over one billion.
THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 348 (Brian Hunter ed., 131st ed. 1994-95).
43. Explanatory Memorandum to Draft Resolution Regarding the Restoration of the Lawful
Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/8392, July 15, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 1094 (1971). The Draft Resolution was sponsored by
Albania, Algeria, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, The People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen, the People's Republic of the Congo, Romania, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Republic
of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Id.
44. In 1972, 71 countries officially recognized the PRC. DOS Report, supra note 34.
Today that number has risen to 159. China's Representative on the Issue of So-Called Taiwan's
"Representation" in UN, Xinhua News Agency News Bulletin, July 23, 1994, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, Xinhua File [hereinafter So-Called Taiwan's "Representation ]. Only
29 states officially recognize Taiwan. Fax from Eric Chou, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
in Los Angeles, (Mar. 23, 1995) (on file with the California Western International Law Journal)
[hereinafter Fax from Taipei Economic and Cultural Office].
[Vol. 25
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recognition by other states, the CCP insisted that the KMT first be de-
recognized.45 In 1971, the U.N. General Assembly voted to replace the
KMT delegation with representatives from the CCP.4 The CCP took the
"Chinese seat" on the Security Council and the KMT was expelled from the
United Nations.47
Although Taiwan was no longer represented in the U.N., it was not
isolated. Taiwan's trading partners merely converted their official ties to
Taiwan into unofficial relations when they recognized the PRC.48 Of the
159 states which currently recognize the CCP as the sole government of
China, over sixty continue to carry on extensive unofficial relations with the
KMT on Taiwan. 49 These nations officially recognize the PRC's claim to
sovereignty over Taiwan. In contrast, Taiwan currently carries on full
diplomatic relations with twenty-nine states.5 0  These nations have no
diplomatic relations with the PRC and thus freely recognize the KMT as the
legitimate government of Taiwan. 5
45. Hungdah Chiu, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China, 8 CHINESE
Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 12-14 (1990). This practice continues today. In recent years, China has
also broken off diplomatic relations with countries which had subsequently resumed diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, e.g.: Grenada, Liberia, Belize and Lesotho. Id. This same tactic was
employed by the KMT in the early years of its existence as a rival government. It broke
relations with the Soviet Union, India, Great Britain and France when these nations recognized
the CCP in 1949 (Soviet Union and India), 1950 (Great Britain), and 1964 (France). FRANK
P. MORELLO, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF FORMOSA 79 (1966).
46. Resolution Regarding the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of
China in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) ("[T]he representatives of the government of the People's Republic
of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.") [hereinafter UN
Resolution on Restoration]. In 1971, during the debate on China's representation in the UN,
the United States advanced a draft resolution allowing for the representation of both Taiwan and
the PRC in the General Assembly pending a peaceful solution to their division. Under the
proposal, the PRC would have replaced Taiwan on the Security Council but Taiwan would have
remained a member of the General Assembly. The Draft Resolution was sponsored by
Australia, Chad, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, Japan,
Lesotho, Liberia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, the United States and
Uruguay. U.N.G.A. Draft Resolution: The Representation of China in the United Nations,
U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Agenda item 96, Sept. 29, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 1100 (1971). It was
never voted on because Taiwan refused to endorse the idea of co-membership. Munro, supra
note 5, at 109.
47. UN Resolution on Restoration, supra note 46.
48. Chiu, supra note 45, at 15.
49. Republic of China's Official, Semi-Official or Unofficial Missions Abroad, 12 CHINESE
Y.B. INT'L L. & AFFAIRS 777-93 (1992-1994) [hereinafter Unofficial Missions].
50. The Bahamas, Belize, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Commonwealth of
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Holy
See, Honduras, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, St.
Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Is., South Africa,
Swaziland, Tonga and Tuvalu. Fax from Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, supra note 44.
51. Id. These states do not recognize Taiwan as a separate state because Taiwan does not
claim that status. Entities not claiming statehood status cannot be recognized as such.
CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 119.
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B. The Nature of Taiwan's Unofficial Relations
The predominant approach to Taiwanese relations was first developed by
Japan in 1972.2 When it recognized the PRC, Japan broke its official ties
to Taiwan and established a private entity, the "Interchange Association," in
Tokyo with an office in Taipei.53 Taiwan then opened the private "Associa-
tion of East Asian Relations" in Taipei with offices in Yokohama, Osaka and
Fukuoka.54 Although nominally private, both associations are funded by
their respective governments. They are staffed by government officials on
leave from their usual agencies." Functionally, they are consulates general
but the Japanese and Taiwanese governments do not recognize them as
such. 6
The Philippines adopted the "Japanese formula" in 1975, and other
nations, including the United States, France, Australia, and New Zealand,
did the same in the years following. 7
Unofficial relations of this nature constitute what Lauterpacht character-
ized as "informal intercourse." 58  Informal intercourse may include
unofficial agreements and may be accompanied by an exchange of representa-
tives.59 Without more, it has no legal effect.6
The United States provides a prime example of how convoluted these
relations can be. 61 Taiwan is the United States' second-largest market in
52. Chiu, supra note 45, at 15.
53. Id. This office was initially headed by the former Japanese ambassador to Taiwan.
Ralph N. Clough, Taiwan's International Status, in MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 20, at 152.
54. Chiu, supra note 45, at 15.
55. Id. These officials are not accorded full diplomatic privileges and immunities but they
have sufficient freedom and access to government officials to allow them to perform essentially
the same functions as diplomats, including issuing visas and facilitating inter-governmental
communications. Clough, supra note 53, at 152.
56. Chiu, supra note 45, at 15.
57. Id.
58. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 346-47.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In 1979, the United States "derecognized" or withdrew official recognition from
Taiwan. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 26. Congress then codified the new relationship in
the Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1990) [hereinafter TRA]. The TRA set up
the nominally private American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). TRA § 6(a)(1). Taiwan then
established the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) as a private entity
to facilitate communications between the U.S. and Taiwan. President Chiang Ching-kuo's
Statement on Establishing a New Organization to Administer New Relations with the United
States, Feb. 15, 1979, 20 FREE CHINA WEEKLY, No. 6, Feb. 18, 1979, at 1 reprinted in CHINA
AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 265-66 (Hungdah Chiu ed., 1979).
When the United States modestly upgraded its relations with Taiwan in September 1994,
the PRC protested that the move was an attempt to foster Taiwanese independence. Holland,
supra note 12. The upgrade allows CCNAA to be renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Office (TECO), thus at least acknowledging whose office it is. U.S. Expands High-level
Meetings with Taiwan, Deutsche Press-Agentur, Sept. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, DPA File. Taiwanese officials can now visit most U.S. government offices and U.S.
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Asia.62 The American Institute in Taiwan which represents U.S. interests
there is staffed by foreign service officers on leaves of absence.63 The
Taiwan Relations Act, which governs U.S.-Taiwan relations, avoids giving
the Taiwanese government any official status by referring to it as the
"governing authorities on Taiwan."'' The TRA also purports to continue
cultural, scientific, and economic contact with the "people of Taiwan," not
the government.65 The TRA expressly allows Taiwan to retain its statehood
status in domestic courts, however,' and specifies that all treaties with
Taiwan in existence at the time the TRA was enacted will continue in force
unless or until abrogated by law.67
Because the PRC sees the economic development of Taiwan as benefiting
all of China upon reunification, it has condoned and even encouraged the
Japanese formula, even in such an intense form as the TRA, as long as the
substance of the relations was confined to trade.68
As a result of continuing trade relations, Taiwan's economy has
prospered. Taiwan now has the twentieth-largest Gross Domestic Product
in the world.69 It is the thirteenth-largest trading economy and the twelfth-
largest exporter of goods.7 ° Its gross national product totals U.S.$220
economic and technical officials can now visit Taiwan. Id. The Clinton administration upgrade
falls short of endorsing Taiwan's current bid for U.N. membership. Holland, supra note 12.
Both houses of Congress, however, introduced concurrent resolutions in January 1995 which
affirm that Taiwan deserves a seat in the U.N. and call on the U.S. to encourage the
establishment of an ad hoc committee at the U.N. to study Taiwanese membership. S. Con.
Res. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. Con. Res. 8, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
U.S. will also support Taiwan's entry into the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Id. GATT membership is open to non-states. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXXIII, 61(5) Stat. A75, 4 Bevans 639.
The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Washington D.C. is staffed by 120
Taiwanese nationals. Jim Mann, Washington Presence: Unofficially, Taiwan is Alive, Well,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Washington Presence]. There is a separate military
procurement section in another building in Washington which has a staff of 70. Id. The TECO
has ten other offices around the United States which are staffed by another 350 to 400 Taiwanese
nationals. Id. The offices are in Atlanta, Chicago, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami,
New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Boston, Kansas City, and Guam. Unofficial Missions., supra
note 49, at 791-92. In contrast, the PRC has only five consulates in the United States. The
World Factbook, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, WOFACT File. The consulates are in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York,
and San Francisco. Id.
62. Caspar W. Weinberger, Taiwan-A Warm and Powerful Friend, FORBES, Jan. 16, 1995,
at 35.
63. TRA, supra note 61, § 11.
64. Id. §2(a).
65. Id. § 2(a)(2).
66. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 4(b)(7); See also New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enter.,
Inc. 954 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1992), cert denied 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992) (holding that Taiwan
is a state for purposes of suit in the United States).
67. TRA, supra note 61, § 4(c). The United States then unilaterally terminated the Mutual
Defense Treaty. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 26.
68. Chiu, supra note 45, at 15.
69. Weinberger, supra note 62.
70. Id.
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72billion" and it holds U.S.$92 billion in foreign currency reserves.
The combination of increased wealth from foreign trade73 and the
political emergence of a generation without ties to the mainland has led the
people of Taiwan to demand more political freedom.74 The main opposition
party, the DPP, was formed in 1986." 5 It won 20% of the contested seats
in that year's election.76 Martial law was ended the next year.' In 1991,
the Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, formally renounced the KMT's claim
to be the only legitimate government of China.78
III. CURRENT VIEWS ON THE STATUS OF TAIWAN
A. Objective or De Facto79 Status
Although it has not yet claimed statehood status and is thus not
recognized as such by any nations, Taiwan meets the traditional criteria for
statehood.' It has a permanent population inhabiting a defined territory.
Its government is in effective control of that territory and it has the capacity
to carry on relations with other states.
71. Edward A. Gargan, Taiwan Pushes to Rebuild Its Position in Global Community, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 8.
72. Weinberger, supra note 62.
73. Per capita GDP in Taiwan is U.S.$12,000. Id.
74. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xxvi. See also Michael C. Davis, The Concept
of Statehood and the Status of Taiwan, 4 J. CHINESE L. 135, 143 (1990).
75. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xxiv.
76. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1245. Although the formation of the DPP was technically
illegal under martial law, the KMT allowed it to operate. Opposition groups had run in
elections prior to 1986 as "non-partisans." Id.
77. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xxv.
78. On April 30, President Lee formally recognized the PRC. Id. at xxvii.
79. The term de facto describes a situation which exists even though the law does not
officially sanction or recognize its existence. Accordingly, de facto states are those which meet
the criteria for statehood despite lack of legal recognition by other states. International law calls
upon other nations to respect the rights of de facto states and, in return, expects de facto states
to abide by the norms of international law. Bi-lateral relations between de facto states and non-
recognizing states are confined to what is necessary to meet the minimum requirements of
international law. This situation is contrasted with that of a de jure state. A de jure state is one
which is legally recognized by other states. De jure states are accorded the full rights and
privileges of statehood by recognizing states. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 336-46. For
a discussion of some of the potential consequences of denying recognition to de facto states, see
OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 197-203.
80. The requirements for statehood, as set out in the Montevideo Convention are: (1) a
defined territory, (2) a permanent population, (3) an effective government and (4) the capacity
to enter into relations with other states. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, done
at Montevideo, Uruguay, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter
Montevideo Convention]. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201
(1987).
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RECOGNITION OF TAIWANESE STATEHOOD
1. Permanent Population
Taiwan has a population of roughly twenty million.8 1 Eighteen million
are ethnic Han Chinese. Of these, sixteen million are native Taiwanese,
descendants of the Chinese who migrated across the Strait in the 18th and
19th centuries and lived under Cheng and later, Japanese rule.' They
speak a variety of dialects which are distinct from Mandarin, the official
language of the PRC and the KMTI3 The remaining two million ethnic
Chinese are Mandarin speaking "mainlanders" who came across in 1949 after
the defeat of the nationalist government.' In addition to native and main-
land-born ethnic Chinese, there are an estimated 330,000 aborigines who are
descendants of the Malayo-Polynesian headhunting tribes which populated the
island prior to Chinese contact. 85 Regarded as barbarians, they were driven
into the internal mountain regions under Chinese and Japanese rule and they
remain carefully watched by the KMT today.86 When the mainlanders
arrived in 1949, they regarded both the native Taiwanese and indigenous
populations as an inferior peasant class and treated them accordingly. 7
Today the lines between mainland and native-born Taiwanese are softening
but the resentment remains.88 The aboriginal population still remains
isolated from Taiwanese society to a large degree.89
2. Defined Territory
The current Taiwanese government has been in effective control over the
island of Formosa, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy Island and Mazu Island
since 1945, when the territories were returned to China at the end of World
War 11. 0 Since 1991, these islands are the only territory it claims.
3. Effective Government
The authorities on Taiwan operate under a Constitution promulgated in
1947. 91 It provides for a government consisting of an elected National
81. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242.
82. Id.
83. The two main dialects are Hakka and Fukien. John Franklin Copper, Political Develop-
ment in Taiwan, in CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 37 (Hungdah Chiu ed., 1979).
84. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242.
85. Buruma, supra note 21, at 180; YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242.
86. Johnston, supra note 20, at 21.
87. Buruma, supra note 21, at 172.
88. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242.
89. Buruma, supra note 21, at 178-82.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 25-36.
91. XIANFA [Constitution of the Republic of China] (1947) translated in [1994 Binder XIX]
Const. Countries World, (Oceana Pub., Inc.) James T. Seymour, Taiwan-Republic of China I
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Taiwan Const.].
1995]
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Assembly which then elects a president and vice-president. 92 Article twelve
of the Constitution was amended in 1991 to allow the president and vice-
president to be elected by popular suffrage beginning in 1996. 93 The Na-
tional Assembly has the power to amend the Constitution and the powers of
referendum and initiative.94 Below the president are five administrative
branches known as Yuans. The Executive Yuan is similar to the U.S.
president's cabinet and performs policy and administrative functions.95
Parliamentary functions are performed by the Legislative Yuan,96 which is
popularly elected.' The Control Yuan monitors efficiency of the public
service and investigates allegations of corruption. 9 The Judicial Yuan is
a seventeen-member supreme court which interprets the Taiwanese constitu-
tion.99 The Examination Yuan recruits civil servants through a competitive
examination process."
This governmental structure was brought over by the KMT in 1949.
Originally, it was a full government in exile with seats in the National
Assembly and Legislative Yuan for representatives from each province on the
mainland.'0 ' Today, these bodies have representatives only from Tai-
wan. 102
4. Capacity
The Taiwanese government's capacity to carry on relations with other
states is abundantly clear. It has full diplomatic relations with twenty-nine
states.10 3 It enters into treaties with these governments and through agree-
ments with them, effectively signs on to multilateral treaties.'°4
92. Id. art. 27.
93. Taiwan Const., supra note 91, art. 12 (amended May 1, 1991).
94. Id. art. 27.
95. Id. arts. 53-61.
96. Id. arts. 62-76.
97. Id. art. 62.
98. Id. arts. 90-106.
99. Id. arts. 77-82; YEARBOOK supra note 1, at 1244.
100. Taiwan Const., supra note 91, arts. 83-89.
101. Id. art. 26, §§ 1-4; art. 64, §§ 1-4.
102. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 27, at xxv-xxvi. In 1988, when the Kuomintang Central
Standing Committee approved a restructuring of the legislature which would phase out all the
old mainland seats in the Yuans. The next year, the Voluntary Retirement Act was passed,
offering retirement incentives to those members of the Yuans who were elected on the mainland
prior to the government's move to Taiwan. Id.
103. Fax from Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, supra note 44.
104. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes between the Republic of China and the Kingdom of
Tonga Concerning Mutual Implementation of the International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships 1969, July 12, 1982 reprinted in 7 Treaties between the Republic of
China and Foreign States 1982-1985, 260-61, cited in Chiu, supra note 45, at 17 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ed., 1986).
[Vol. 25
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RECOGNITION OF TAIWANESE STATEHOOD
B. The PRC's Perspective
The People's Republic of China views Taiwan as an inalienable part of
its territory.1 °5 Under this view, the Chinese Communist Party is the only
legitimate government of China by virtue of its victory over the KMT in the
Chinese Civil War. 1"6 The Kuomintang is seen as a local government
which continues to resist the rightful rule of Beijing."0 7
As the one legal government of China, the CCP conceives of reunifica-
tion under a "one country, two systems" framework similar to that proposed
for Hong Kong. 08 Under the "one country, two systems" plan, Taiwan
would become a Special Administrative Region" with its own economic
system and a "high degree" of local autonomy, but all sovereign power
would be vested in the CCP.°"0 Taiwan would keep its own administrative
and legislative powers, maintain an independent judiciary with the right of
local adjudication, and retain its military."' The Taiwanese government
would be allowed to enter into commercial and cultural agreements with
foreign countries regarding the territory under its local administration, much
as it does now." 2  It would also "enjoy certain rights in foreign af-
fairs""' 3 which are left undefined."
4
The CCP fails to specify how long the "one country, two systems"
framework might exist after reunification or to define it in more than these
broad terms.'' 5 The details of the "one country, two systems" concept and
105. "Taiwan is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan and
accomplish the great cause of unifying our motherland." XIANFA [Constitution] (1978) pmbl
translated in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 130
(Joseph En-pao Wang, ed., 1979). Under the 1982 Constitution, this language was replaced
with the affirmation that "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of
China. It is part of the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in
Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland." XIANFA [Constitution]
(1982) pmbl. translated in [1993-Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH Australia
Ltd.) 4-500 [hereinafter China Laws].
106. PRC White Paper, supra note 12.
107. Id.
108. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 478. See Joint Declaration of the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, done at Beijing, Sept. 26, 1984,
U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 (1984) [hereinafter Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong].
109. The PRC Constitution provides for the establishment of special administrative regions
as necessary. XIANFA [Constitution] (1982) art 31, translated in China Laws, supra note 105.
110. PRC White Paper, supra note 12.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Given the PRC's record in Tibet, this lack of specificity may be cause for concern.
Historically Tibet has been under some form of Chinese hegemony since the 13th century. From
1911 to 1950, however, it was effectively independent. In late 1950, the PRC army marched
into Tibet to "liberate" it. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 384-85 (Alan Cohen
1995]
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how it might work in practice will become clearer in 1997, however, when
Hong Kong comes under PRC control. 6
The PRC would regard any declaration of independence by Taiwan as
an unlawful secession which it would be entitled to resist by force." 7
Under international law, if other nations were to become involved, they
would be regarded as intervening in the PRC's internal affairs.' 8 Beijing
characterizes current actions by Taiwan's trading partners that appear to
support Taiwanese independence as just this sort of intervention."l 9
C. Taiwan's Perspective
The Taiwanese position is not as easy to discern as the PRC's. Since
martial law was lifted in 1986, Taiwan has been developing a very active
democratic process. There are currently three main political parties in
Taiwan: the KMT, the DPP and the New Party. 0 Each has its own
conception of Taiwan's international status. The KMT still holds most of the
power in Taiwan, although in the last round of elections, in December 1994,
the DPP gained several seats in the National Assembly and the Taipei City
Council and won the mayor's race in Taipei.'
1. The Kuomintang Party
As previously noted, the KMT has given up its historical claim to
sovereignty over the entire state of China. Forty-six years after fleeing the
and Hungdah Chiu eds., 1981). Tibet appealed to the United Nations for help but was virtually
ignored. Id. at 385. Soon thereafter, the PRC forced Tibet to sign an agreement accepting
Chinese rule. Id. In it Beijing promised to "not alter the existing political system in Tibet [or
the] established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama." Agreement on the
Administration of Tibet, May 23, 1951, P.R.C.-Tibet, para 4 reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra at 391-93. The agreement was followed by increasing
governmental and military control over Tibetan affairs and a huge influx of Chinese immigrants.
1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra at 394. In March 1959, when Tibet
declared its independence and rebelled, the PRC army crushed the revolt, purged the Tibetan
leaders and sent thousands into exile, including the Dalai Lama. Id. at 394. In May of that
year, the PRC asserted that Tibet was "an inalienable part of China's territory." Id. This is
the same phrase it uses for Taiwan. See, e.g., Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of
Recognition and Multi-System Nations with Special Reference to the Chinese (Mainland-Taiwan)
Case, in MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 55 app. 2.
116. Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, supra note 108, arts 1-2.
117. PRC White Paper, supra note 12. Russia's recent military action against the separatist
enclave of Chechnya provides a vivid example of this sort of sovereign prerogative. Other
nations have condemned the action but none has felt obligated to stop it. See, e.g., Barbara
Crossette, What is a Nation?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at A10.
118. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 126-27 (3d. ed. 1976).
119. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 12 (quoting Chinese sources as saying that President
Clinton's elevation of relations with Taiwan amounts to "gross interference in China's internal
affairs and an infringement on its sovereignty").
120. Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
121. James Kynge, Strong Nationalist Showing Averts China Crisis, Reuters World Service,
Dec. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
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mainland for Taiwan, those in the KMT who have ties to the mainland are
aging and a new generation of leaders is emerging who have no recollection
of the mainland and greatly weakened loyalties to it. Most members of
the Kuomintang Party today, including President Lee Teng-hui, were born
in Taiwan. 23
Despite weakened loyalties, the KMT does not go so far as to claim
independent statehood for Taiwan. There are three main reasons for this.
First, the KMT justified its initially brutal rule-and its forty years of martial
law-on the premise that it was the legal government of China 24 which
was fighting a civil war and intended to someday reunify the Chinese
state. 125 Second, although it no longer claims to be the sole legal govern-
ment, the KMT wants Taiwan to be part of a unified China.126 Among the
ethnic Chinese-both Mainlanders and native-born Taiwanese-who make up
the KMT, there is a very strong sense of cultural affinity with the main-
land. 27  Chinese political culture has also traditionally placed a strong
emphasis on unity. 12  The KMT is in no hurry to reunify, however. It
wants to maintain the status quo until political and economic conditions on
the mainland are right for unification.'29 The third reason is that the KMT
fears invasion from the mainland. 3 °
During the early 1990s when the DPP was luring KMT voters away
from the party with its talk of independence, the KMT developed its current
position that Taiwan is part of a divided China similar to Korea or pre-
reunification Germany.' If recognized by the outside world, this divided
state concept would allow the Taiwanese people to remain part of China,
while creating a recognized frontier between it and the mainland that the
122. Buruma, supra note 21, at 177.
123. Taiwan: The Rout that Didn't Happen, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1993, at 37, 38.
124. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 1242. The National Assembly and Legislative Yuan of
the Republic of China both included seats for representatives of every province on the mainland.
Id. at 1244.
125. Davis, supra note 74, at 150. See also Temporary Provisions Effective During the
Period of Communist Rebellion, Taiwan Const., supra note 91, at 25, app. 1. These emergency
measures were promulgated on May 10, 1948 just before martial law was declared on the
mainland. Id.
126. Taiwan-White Paper on Cross-Straits Relations (part 2 of 2), BBC Monitoring Service:
Far East, July 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Taiwan
White Paper].
127. Davis, supra note 74, at 157.
128. Id. at 144 (interview with Yeh Chijeng, Prof. of Sociology, National Taiwan
University (Aug. 8, 1989)); Yung Wei, The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations:
A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues and Approaches, in MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 57, 66.
129. Fact Sheet, supra note 8; Taiwan White Paper, supra note 126. When it says that
conditions must be right for reunification, the KMT means that the mainland must become more
economically developed and more democratized than it is now. Davis, supra note 74, at 143
(interview with Ho Defen, Professor of Law, National Taiwan University (Aug. 8, 1989)).
130. Taiwan's Passionate Democrats, supra note 10, at 31.
131. Munro, supra note 5, at 117.
1995]
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PRC could not cross without an international response.132
Divided statehood is not a widely recognized legal concept.133 Gerhard
von Glahn defines a divided state as, "[a state] divided into two entities, each
equipped with an operative government."'' 34  He further notes that the divi-
sions of Germany and Korea were the result of particular historical
circumstances following World War II.135 The ideological bipolarity of the
Cold War facilitated the division of states into communist and "free" entities
132. The Taiwan Straits need not be an international boundary to be a frontier for purposes
of the use of force. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 271-72. A partition line separating one part
of a divided state from another is sufficient to constitute a frontier across which an act of
aggression would be considered a use of force under article 2, section 4 of the United Nations
Charter. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter
U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations]. Such a use of force is considered a per se violation
of international law and may be met with collective self-defense by other nations under Charter
articles 39 and 51. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
133. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 568 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed., 1957) (theorizing that the international status of Germany was "suspended" temporarily);
OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that for practical purposes, the pre-unification status
of Germany was resolved on the basis of the existence of two German states); D.W. GREIG,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-79 (1970) (treating East Germany as a German territory under the de
facto control of the East German government). Brierly does not even mention the subject in his
discussion of States. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 126-61 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed.,
6th ed., 1963). Crawford recognizes the existence of divided states but argues that they should
not be treated as a special category apart from states in general. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at
273.
134. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 70.
135. Id. Von Glahn includes China and Taiwan in this definition as well as North and
South Vietnam. Id. On China specifically see, MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 20.
Germany was the defeated aggressor and its partition was effected in order to "assure that
Germany should never again become a menace to American security or to the peace of the
world." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: POLICY AND PROGRESS
1945-1946, 1 (1947). The goal was to destroy the laws and institutions of Nazism, completely
disarm the country, punish the war criminals and ensure the payment of reparations for war
damage. Id. Despite their desire to eradicate all traces of Nazism, the Allies made clear that
their occupation was not an annexation. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the
Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Governments of the United
States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, Press Release, June 5, 1945 reprinted in Id. at
79. In effect, the sovereignty of the occupation forces lay over Germany like a blanket, but did
not interrupt the continuity of German statehood. DIETER BLUMENWITZ, WHAT IS GERMANY?
EXPLORING GERMANY'S STATUS AFTER WORLD WAR II 30 (1989).
Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. KIM, supra note 25, at 28. After Japan's defeat
in 1945, it surrendered its forces on the Korean peninsula to Soviet troops north of the 38th
parallel and to U.S. troops south of the 38th parallel. Id. at 19. Following the war, there was
to be a four-power trusteeship over Korea for up to five years to allow it to return smoothly to
independence after 35 years under Japanese rule. Id. at 22 (China and the United Kingdom were
the other two powers). Negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on the nature of the
trusteeship broke down when the two sides could not agree. Id. Subsequently, North and South
Korea, with the approval of the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, established their
own separate governments. Id. at 26-27. The Korean War began when forces from the North
attacked the South in an attempt to reunify the country under Kim Il-sung. C. Kenneth
Quinones, Korean War, in 4 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 292 (1983). It ended with
the peninsula firmly divided at the 38th parallel, as it is to this day. Id.
[Vol. 25
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which functioned as separate states but still claimed to be part of the whole
country. 136
Unlike the PRC, the KMT does not view divided statehood as a
hindrance to reunification. In the German and Korean situations, U.N.
membership was not precluded simply because the statehood of the two parts
was in dispute.' 37 Nor has divided state status necessarily been a barrier
to communication and cooperation. 38
China falls more or less neatly into von Glahn's definition of a divided
state. There are two entities-the PRC and Taiwan-and each is equipped
with an operative government, the CCP and the KMT, respectively. The
historical circumstances that divided China were similar to those in operation
for Germany and Korea.139 The circumstances differ in that there was no
foreign occupation of China;1  it was divided without foreign intervention
136. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 70.
137. Germany was divided into the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic
Republic in the East. Both were admitted to the United Nations in 1973. BASIC DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 23-24 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
3d ed., 1993) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Reunification was achieved in 1990. See, e.g.,
Thomas Risse-Kappen, From Mutual Containment to Common Security: Europe During and
After the Cold War, in WORLD SECURITY TRENDS AND CHALLENGES AT CENTURY'S END 123,
136 (Michael T. Klare & Daniel C. Thomas, eds. 1991). Korea remains divided into the
Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north.
Both were admitted to the United Nations in 1991. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra.
138. Prior to U.N. admission, the two Germanies exchanged "Letters of German Unity,"
and signed what was known as the Basic Treaty. Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations,
Dec. 21, 1973, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 12 I.L.M. 16-24 (1973). The Basic Treaty and its supple-
mental protocols provided the mechanisms for cooperation between East and West Germany on
such subjects as peace and security, trade, travel, communications and inter-governmental
contact. Id. arts. 3, 5, 7 & Supp. Protocol at 16-18. North and South Korea signed a similar
agreement. Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression & Exchanges and Cooperation
between the South and the North, Dec. 13, 1991, R.O.K.-P.D.R.K., reprinted in KOREA
NEWSREVIEW, Dec. 21, 1991, at 10-11. It allows divided families to travel across the demilita-
rized zone (art. 18), provides for the establishment of postal and telecommunications services
between the North and South (art. 20), and makes provision for governmental contacts (art. 8).
The gradual easing of tensions effected by the German Basic Treaty and the informal communi-
cation that was possible within the United Nations framework are considered to have improved
relations between the two Germanies prior to reunification. BLUMENWITZ, supra note 135, at
58 (noting views expressed by the Foreign Minister of the F.R.G. before the U.N. General
Assembly). Although the Reconciliation Treaty has been largely ignored by North and South
Korea, there is still hope that the 1991 admission of North and South Korea to the United
Nations will ease tensions and help facilitate the reunification of Korea. CRAWFORD, supra note
36, at 283. Since 1953, the United Nations has repeatedly affirmed that its main objective with
regard to Korea is the peaceful achievement of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 811, U.N. GAOR 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/2890(1954); G.A. Res. 2668, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/8028(1970). The KMT has made much of this argument. See Davis, supra note 74, at 144 (Inter-
view with Wei Yung, Chancellor, Sun Yat-sen Institute of Policy Research and Development(Aug. 19, 1989)); Request to Include the Republic of China U.N. Membership Issue in the
Agenda of the 48th Sess. of the UNGA, U.N. GAOR 48th Sess., Annex 4 at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/48/191 (1993), reprinted in 11 CHINESEY.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 261-65 (1991-1992) [hereinaf-
ter Request to Include]. (stating that UN membership was not incompatible with German or
Korean reunification, therefore it would not interfere with the reunification of China).
139. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 70-72.
140. Id.
17
Attix: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan's Trading Par
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
374 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
through a civil war. 41
Nonetheless, the willingness of the United States to recognize and
militarily support the non-communist government on Taiwan effectively
prevented the PRC from attempting to reunite the country by force. 42
This solidified the division of China along ideological lines in much the same
way as physical occupation divided Germany and Korea. 143
Along the lines of the German and Korean models, the KMT conceives
of reunification through a series of contacts and negotiations designed to ease
hostilities between the two entities.'" The process has begun with "people
to people" exchanges 14  and unofficial talks between the two govern-
ments."46 The KMT envisions these meetings leading to the creation of a
"reunification consultation institution" through which the two governments
would officially negotiate reunification over the long term. 147  During this
process the KMT wants Taiwan to be represented on an equal footing with
the PRC in international affairs. 4 '
141. Id. See also supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
142. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 71; HOOBLER, supra note 37, at 30.
143. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 71.
144. Taiwan White Paper, supra note 126.
145. Under the "people to people" concept, official visits are not permitted but "various
private contacts of an indirect nature" are encouraged. Davis, supra note 74, at 138 n. 10.
These contacts have included: private visits of DPP leaders to the People's Republic; visits to
family members living in the PRC and to ancestral gravesites; direct Red Cross contacts; and
exchanges of journalists from both sides of the Straits. Id. at 138. See also RALPH N. CLOUGH,
REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: PEOPLE TO PEOPLE DIPLOMACY (1993).
146. On March 9, 1991, Taiwan established the private Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)
to make unofficial contacts and negotiate with China. In December of the same year, China
established the unofficial Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). In
1992, the ARATS sent an invitation to the chairman of the SEF to meet to discuss cultural,
economic and trade exchanges. Hungdah Chiu, Introduction to Agreements Concerning Cross-
Strait Activities done at Singapore on Apr. 29, 1993, A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F., 32 I.L.M. 1217
(1993) (Introduction only available on LEXIS) [hereinafter ARATS-SEF Agreement]. On April
29, 1993 Taiwan and China, through these non-governmental counterparts, signed an agreement
which provided for the beginnings of cross-straits relations in the areas of illegal migration,
smuggling, fishing disputes, protection of intellectual property, and judicial cooperation.
ARATS-SEF Agreement, supra, para. 1, at 1221. They agreed to further talks on economic
exchanges and on cooperation in energy and resources. Id. paras. 2 & 3, at 1221. They also
agreed to promote cultural, educational, scientific and technological exchanges. Id. para. 4, at
1221. On August 7, 1994, the two signed an accord in which the mainland accepted the
jurisdiction of Taiwanese courts over certain issues including skyjacking and fishing disputes.
Annie Thomas, La Chine Reconnait pour la Premire Fois l'Autoritg Juridique d Taiwan,
Agence France Presse, Aug. 8, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRESSE File.
This occasion also marked the first time since 1949 that a mainland official has visited the
island, albeit in an unofficial capacity as the head of the ARATS delegation. Patrice de Beer,
Les Relations Entre Pekin et Taipeh: La Premire Visite Officielle d'un Responsable de la Chine
a Taiwan a Pernis la Conclusion de Plusieurs Accords, LE MONDE, Aug. 11, 1994, at 7. Trade
between Taiwan and the PRC now amounts to US$10 billion per year. All of which is routed
through third ports such as Hong Kong. Ellis, supra note 11.
147. Taiwan White Paper, supra note 126.
148. Id. Taiwan has shown a degree of flexibility with regard to how it is known in the
few international organizations in which it retains membership. It is called "Taiwan, China"
in INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization), and "Chinese Taipei" at APEC
(Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation). When finally admitted to GATT, it will be known as
18
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Acceptance of the divided state concept has been difficult. When Taiwan
applied for membership in the United Nations in 1993, 49 the PRC objected
to the idea and blocked the matter's inclusion in the daily agenda.," The
same thing happened when the KMT brought the issue before the General
Assembly again in 1994.'
2. The Democratic People's Party
The DPP supports full and official independence for Taiwan. If it wins
the presidency in 1996, the DPP has vowed that it will submit the matter to
the people in a national referendum on self-determination.' 52 The DPP is
made up mostly of native Taiwanese who felt marginalized by the main-
"The Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." There is a limit to this
pragmatism, however. At the ADB (Asian Development Bank), Taiwan's name was changed
from the Republic of China to "Taipei, China." Because this was done without Taiwan's
permission at the insistence of the PRC, Taiwan has stated that it attends meetings under protest
and that such attendance should in no way be interpreted as expressing acceptance of the name.
The Republic of China and Inter-governmental Organizations, 11 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. &
AFF. 268, 269 (1991-1992).
149. Request to Include, supra note 138, 4. So-called Taiwan's "Representation, "supra
note 44.
150. Francis Deron et Philippe Pons, L'Assemblge Ginrale des Nations Unies: La Chine
a rdussi ei empcher le retour de Taiwan au Sein de ' ONU, LE MONDE, Sept. 23, 1994, at 3
[hereinafter Assemblge Ggngrale]. So-Called Taiwan's "Representation, "supra note 44. U.N.
membership is open only to states. Any membership vote by the General Assembly must be
approved by the Security Council where China has a veto. U.N. CHARTER, art. 4 2. It is
unlikely that China would have to exercise its veto in this matter however. Regarding Taiwan's
latest push for membership, U.N. Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali affirmed "there is only
one China ... we refuse any contact, direct or indirect, with Taiwan." U.N. Adheres to One
China Position: U.N. Chief, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, Xinhua File.
151. Assemble Gngrale, supra note 150. See also Request to Include the Republic of
China U.N. Membership Issue in the Agenda of the 49th Sess. of the U.N.G.A, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/144 (1994) reprinted in 12 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 199-205
(1992-1994).
152. Taiwan's Passionate Democrats, supra note 7, at 31; Ellis, supra note 11. The
Taiwanese term for self-determination, zijui means "we decide." Davis, supra note 74, at 148.
Self-determination is a concept which developed as the moral imperative for the decolonization
of European and Japanese Colonies following World War II. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, 86 A.J.I.L. 46, 54 (1992). During the decolonization period,
self-determination was narrowly interpreted as the right of peoples living under foreign
domination to throw off the colonial yoke and freely determine their own political destinies. Id.
In contrast, the territorial integrity and political unity of nations already independent of colonial
control were given precedence over the internal self-determination of distinct peoples living
within their borders. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 132, at 124.
In recent years, self-determination has been adopted as the battle cry of minority ethnic,
religious, and linguistic groups living within independent nations. See generally Franck, supra,
at 46-91. As such, self-determination is now viewed by some as a destablizing force with the
potential to fragment the international status quo into a million autonomous pieces. See, e.g.,
Butros Butros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at para. 17, U.N. Doc.
S/24111 (1992).
The Taiwanese idea of zijui carries none of this conceptual baggage. It is more a simple
call for democratic decision making than the invocation of a legal right of distinct peoples.
Davis, supra note 74, at 148.
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lander-dominated KMT. 153  It was in the forefront of the democracy
movement of the 1980s. The DPP fought a long battle to open Taiwanese
politics to participation by non-mainlanders."5 4 Now that Taiwan is
functioning as a democracy, the DPP is not about to give up its new-found
freedom to be part of a unified China. DPP leaders play down the possibility
of invasion from the mainland by citing Taiwan's close relations with the
West, especially the United States. 55 They do not believe that the world
could stand by and watch as China consolidated its power over Taiwan." 6
In the 1992 election for the National Assembly, the DPP included a
"Pro-Taiwan Independence Clause" in its party program and held rallies for
independence. 57 Although the DPP was defeated in National Assembly
elections, support for independence was decriminalized the next year. 5
Since 1993, the DPP has been free to hold rallies and publish newspapers
critical of the KMT's position.
3. The New Party
The New Party is really the old guard. It is a splinter party formed by
the "mainlander" faction of the KMT. '59 It was founded in 1993, by seven
KMT dissidents who were disillusioned with the corruption of the KMT and
who wanted a renewed commitment to reunification."' ° The New Party
accuses the KMT of becoming "Taiwanized" and of pandering to the DPP's
cries for independence by adopting the divided state theory.' 6' The New
Party does not believe that President Lee and the KMT are serious about
153. Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
154. Sunny Goh, MayorAh Bian Out to Transform Taipei, THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 11,
1994, at 3.
155. Davis, supra note 74, at 150.
156. Id. In such a case the United States, at least, could find itself obligated to intervene
on Taiwan's behalf. The TRA contains strong affirmations that the United States supports
peaceful reunification and would meet any military action against Taiwan with force. TRA,
supra note 61, at §§ 2(b)(4), 2(b)(6). But Cf., Munro, supra note 5, at 122 (pointing out that
a declaration of independence by Taiwan might nullify these provisions because the issue would
no longer be reunification and Taiwan could be seen as having unwisely provoked Beijing).
157. Taiwan and China: PRC Journal Says "Two Chinas" Policy will "Plunge Taiwan into
Great Disaster," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Great Disaster].
158. Great Disaster, supra note 157. In May 1993, the Legislative Yuan amended article
100 of Taiwan's criminal code so that the crime of "inciting internal strife" would be confined
to instances of violence or coercion against the state. Id. "Rebellion by words" and "peaceful
rebellion" which would have included non-violent support for Taiwanese independence, are no
longer punishable. Id. They are now protected under law. Id. Leaders of the Taiwanese
independence movement were released from prison. Id.
159. Lawrence Chung, Taiwan's Biggest Election Rally Backs "One China, "Agence France
Presse, Nov. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRESSE File.
160. Taiwan Holds First Free Local Elections, supra note 9; Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
161. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Taiwan Politics Comes of Age, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 30, 1994, at 23.
[Vol. 25
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reunification and accuses them of secretly plotting independence.,62 It
warns against possible invasion by the PRC if independence is declared.163
New Party candidates have had the most success when campaigning against
corruption in the KMT. "
4. Which View will Prevail in Taiwan?
According to the KMT, its divided state idea received approval from the
voters in the last general elections which were held in 1992.165 The
December 1994 election results were equivocal. Voter turnout was around
75%.166 The elections were for the offices of Provincial Governor and
Mayor of Taipei and Mayor of Kaohsiung. 167  The Governorship was
formerly an appointed post, while the Mayors' offices had not been directly
elected since 1964 and 1977.168
The Taipei mayoral race was won by the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-
bian. 169 Although devoted to the cause of independence, 70 Mr. Chen
avoided the subject during his campaign. 17' He ran instead on a platform
of improving the quality of life for Taipei's citizens. 72 Taipei's incumbent
KMT mayor, Huang Ta-chou, seems to have been blamed for Taipei's traffic
problems, pollution, and the many delays and setbacks in the construction of
the city's new subway system. 173  The only candidate to make indepen-
dence an issue was the New Party candidate, Jaw Shaw-kong, who came in
second. 174  The New Party held the largest rally in Taiwan's history in
162. Id.
163. Taiwan Holds First Free Local Elections, supra note 9.
164. For example, the New Party received a strong protest vote among KMT voters
concerned about collusion between the KMT and financial interests in Taipei. In the 1994
Taipei mayoral race, the New Party beat the KMT by 5.28%. Philip Liu, Taiwan: The Election
Results-A Milestone in Democratization, Business Taiwan, Dec. 12, 1994 available in LEXIS,
News Library, REUTER File. The results were DPP 43.67%, New Party 31.17%, KMT
25.89%. Id.
165. The Rout that Didn't Happen, supra note 123. See also Munro, supra note 5, at 117-
119.
166. Weinberger, supra note 62, at 35.
167. Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
168. Dennis Engbarth, Gains for Opposition in Taiwan Elections, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at 1.
169. Liu, supra note 164.
170. Goh, supra note 154, at 3. Mr. Chen's political career has been devoted to the fight
for democracy and independence. Id. He spent eight months in prison in 1986 for his involve-
ment with an opposition magazine critical of the KMT. Id.
171. Liu, supra note 164. During his campaign, Mr. Chen flew the Taiwanese national
flag at his campaign headquarters. Goh, supra note 154, at 3. This is something the DPP never
does because it implies acceptance of the KMT's position on reunification. Id.
172. Liu, supra note 164.
173. Id.
174. Liu, supra note 164.
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Taipei to protest the idea of Taiwanese independence.175
In contrast to Taipei, independence was a hotly contested issue in the
Governor's race, which the KMT won. The Governorship of Taiwan is the
second most powerful office in Taiwan after the Presidency 176 and currently
the highest elected post. 77 The KMT candidate, James Soong, won with
56.2% of the vote. 178  The DPP, which received 38.7% of the vote, 179
campaigned on a pro-independence platform." s  The KMT also won the
mayor's race in Kaohsiung with 54.46% of the vote.'
From across the Straits, Beijing watched the elections with disdain.
Official news agency reports zeroed in on election-related violence, bribery
and dirty campaign tactics.8 2 The PRC views Taiwan's democratization
as leading inexorably to Taiwanese independence.8 3
No clear message emerges from the 1994 election results. On one hand,
the DPP victory in Taipei seems to be more a mandate to get the subway
running than a call for independence. On the other hand, the new mayor,
Mr. Chen was a well-known member of the Legislative Yuan and a high-
profile leader of the democracy and independence movements.' The New
Party was able to mobilize 50,000 people to protest independence, but polls
taken before the election showed most Taiwanese opposing reunification.8 5
The governor's race was the only one in which the DPP campaigned strongly
for independence and it lost. Its candidate, however, was a relative
unknown. 8 6 The one thing that is certain is that the DPP is now a well-
established opposition party with the potential to one day unseat the KMT.
If and when that happens, Taiwan's trading partners may be forced to decide
whether they will stay out of China's internal affairs or whether they will
support the wishes of the Taiwanese people as expressed through free
elections.
175. Chung, supra note 159. 50,000 people attended the rally. Id.
176. Taiwan Holds First Free Local Elections, supra note 9.
177. Engbarth, supra note 168, at 7. The Governor is responsible for the domestic affairs
of all Taiwan except Taipei, Kaohsiung, Quemoy and Mazu. Ethnicity Not So Vital for Taiwan
Voters, Japan Economic Newswire, Dec. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File
[hereinafter Ethnicity Not So Vital].
178. Liu, supra note 164.
179. Id.
180. Ethnicity Not So Vital, supra note 177. DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh alleges election
fraud by the KMT, citing extremely high turnouts, defeats in several DPP strongholds and
reports of "widespread irregularities" at the polls. Dennis Engbarth, Polls Give President a
Boost, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at 7.
181. Liu, supra note 164.
182. Mainland Views Taiwan Elections: Taiwan Elections Reportedly Characterized by
"Chaos, " Misdeeds and Bribery, New China News Agency Domestic News Service, Dec. 9,
1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, BBC File.
183. So-called Taiwan's "Representation" supra note 44.
184. Liu, supra note 164; Goh, supra note 154, at 3.
185. Tempest, supra note 12, at A12.
186. Liu, supra note 164.
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IV. TRADE RELATIONS AND IMPLIED RECOGNITION
In the midst of the current foment about Taiwanese independence,
Taiwan's trading partners are attempting to carry on relations with Taiwan
in the way they always have. However, their words, and especially their
actions, are being closely monitored by all sides.187
Recently, Beijing has expressed concern regarding two develop-
ments.188 First, a total of ten nations have now concluded agreements with
Taiwan to fly commercial aircraft directly into its airspace. 89 Second, the
pace of arms sales to Taiwan has picked up in the last few years. Between
1990 and 1994, the United States, France, Germany, and others sold Taiwan
U.S.$10 billion worth of weapons.'9g Although technically trade issues,
these actions spill over into the political arena and are seen by the PRC-and
Taiwan as well-as implying the intent to recognize Taiwan as an indepen-
dent state.
A. Conduct Implying Recognition
Recognition is an act intended or calculated to give rise to legal rights
and obligations between states and/or governments. 191 Recognition may be
187. See PRC White Paper, supra note 12 Taiwan's Passionate Democrats, supra note 10(describing the Taiwanese government as "charmed" by U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico
Pena's visit to the Taiwanese Foreign Minister in his office).
188. PRC White Paper, supra note 12.
189. See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 215-228 and accompanying text.
191. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 6. There are two views on the effect of recognition.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91 (4th ed. 1990). The
dominant theory is that it is merely declarative of a situation that already exists; i.e., that the
entity involved has achieved the status of statehood or that the government involved is the
effective governing authority in the territory. Id. at 88-89. Under this view, a state or
government may exist without being recognized by other states. Id. at 89. The main function
of recognition under the declaratory theory is, therefore, "to acknowledge the fact of the state
or government's political existence and to declare the recognizing state's willingness to treat the
entity as an international person with the rights and obligations of a state." HENKIN, supra note
19, at 244.
The other view is that recognition is constitutive. Id. Under this view, the act of recog-
nition by other states confers international legal personality on an entity purporting to be a state
or government. Id. Cf, LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 63 (postulating that while recognition
is constitutive, states have a duty to recognize entities which meet the criteria of statehood).
Though the constitutive view is in the minority, there are situations in which it may be argued
that recognition is constitutive even if it is considered declarative most of the time. For
example, states in the process of formation which have not yet met the full requirements of
statehood, or insurgencies not yet meeting the requirements of full effectiveness as governments,
may benefit from recognition because it gives them access to foreign aid which may help them
to consolidate the territory and/or enhance their legitimacy with the population. Examples
include: France's recognition of the United States in 1778, the United States' recognition of
Israel in 1948 and India's recognition of Bangladesh in 1972. It may also be ineffective, as in
the case of Biafra which was recognized by five states between 1967 and 1970 but ultimately
failed to gain independence from Nigeria. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 143-44.
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either express or implied."9 In either case, the crucial factor is the exis-
tence of the intent on the part of the recognizing state, to give rise to legal
rights and obligations. 193  Express recognition is unequivocal. 9  It nor-
mally consists of a formal statement by the recognizing state that it intends
to recognize the other state and carry on diplomatic relations with it."5
This is usually accompanied by the opening of embassies and consulates and
the exchange of ambassadors. 19
6
Implied recognition is deduced from the way a state conducts its relations
with an unrecognized entity. 197 Due to the nature of the international legal
system, in which sovereign states enjoy a high degree of freedom from
imposed obligations, recognition is rarely implied.'98 The exception to this
general rule is the conclusion of a bilateral treaty regulating relations between
the state and the new entity and/or the exchange of official representa-
tives.' 99 This is considered highly indicative of the requisite intent to
engage in full diplomatic relations and is, thus, often held to imply
recognition."
Anything less than such a treaty or exchange will not necessarily confer
recognition on a state or government.2°' This is because the expression of
intent would be too vague to serve as a basis for applying the substantial
rights and duties of statehood or governmental legitimacy to a state's
relations with an unrecognized entity.2 2
A further reason for this is that recognition is often withheld as a form
of sanction against governments which have come to power through extra-
constitutional means or against entities purporting to be states but whose
existence violates a jus cogens principle of international law.20 3 In light of
192. Montevideo Convention, supra note 80, art 7; OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 169;
TUNG, supra note 3, at 50; VERZIJL, supra note 3, at 582.
193. OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 169.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 370.
199. Id.
200. Id. BROWNLIE, supra note 191, at 96.
201. BROWNLIE, supra note 191, at 96. The exchange of unofficial representatives,
exchange of letters and memoranda, admission to international organizations, andparticipation
in international conferences would all fall short of expressing the requisite intent.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 346. See also, TUNG, supra note 3, at 50 (writing in 1968,
before the United States officially recognized the PRC, that diplomatic negotiations between the
two nations at over 130 meetings had failed to imply recognition).
202. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 346.
203. For example, in 1965, the white minority under Ian Smith took power in Southern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and proclaimed independence. The U.N. Security Council passed
a resolution "[c]ondemning the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority" and calling on
all states to withhold recognition and refrain from any dealings with the "illegal" state.
Resolution Concerning Southern Rhodesia, S.C. Res. 217, UN SCOR, 20th Sess., 1265th mtg.
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1965).
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this fact, Lauterpacht explicitly states that to imply recognition from conduct
is "particularly inappropriate when the general attitude of the state in
question points to its continued determination to deny recognition.
B. Is there an Implicit Intent to Recognize Taiwan?
Those among Taiwan's trading partners which recognize the PRC, have
always been very careful to accompany any change in unofficial relations
with an affirmation of the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. 5 Given the
intense nature of Taiwan's relations with its trading partners and the history
behind them, however, these affirmations do not clearly "point[] to a
continued determination to deny recognition" but rather, to an attempt to
mollify the PRC while still benefiting from trade with Taiwan.20
In other words, non-recognition is not being used to express any sort of
distaste for the Taiwanese entity or for its government. There is no
indication that these states are withholding recognition because they find
Taiwan's existence repugnant or its actions in violation of any jus cogens
principle of international law. On the contrary, most of them formerly
recognized the KMT, at least initially, as the de jure government of China
after it moved to Taiwan. Many continue to be vigorous supporters of the
Taiwanese government, though on an unofficial level.27
If the CCP did not precondition diplomatic relations on non-recognition
of the government of Taiwan, these nations would be unlikely to object to
official recognition the KMT, or any other freely-elected government, as the
legitimate government of Taiwan. In the absence of objections from the
PRC, most of them might also recognize Taiwan as a state were it to declare
itself one.
Beijing is fully aware of this situation.2 °" Thus, the constant verbal
204. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 371.
205. For example, when the U.S. upgraded relations this year, a senior administration
official stressed that the change was merely an "adjustment" and that it represents no alteration
of the United States' "fundamental" policy of recognizing China's claim to sovereignty over
Taiwan. U.S. Expands High-level Meetings with Taiwan, supra note 61.
206. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 371.
207. Thailand and the Philippines receive President Lee at the highest level but unofficially.
Philip Bowring, America's "New" Policy on Taiwan is Timid and Unimaginative, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 12, 1994, at 6 (comparing current U.S. policy with that of more supportive states).
In the United States, Senator Paul Simon and others have criticized US policy and urged closer
contacts with, and more support for, Taiwan. Steven Greenhouse, U.S., Despite Critics, Is to
Expand Taiwan Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at A5; Marilyn Green, U.S. Edges Toward
Closer Ties with Taiwan, But Not Too Close, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1994, at 7A. In March
1995, Senator Barbara Murkowski and 35 other senators submitted a concurrent resolution
expressing the sense of the Senate that President Lee should be allowed to visit the United States
in a private capacity. Sen. Con. Res. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Mr. Lee is an alumnus
of Cornell University and has been prohibited from accepting Cornell's invitation to visit. Id.
See also Weinberger, supra note 62, at 35 (writing for the business magazine Forbes, Former
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is generous with his praise of Taiwan and its emerging
democratic process).
208. PRC White Paper, supra note 12.
1995]
25
Attix: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan's Trading Par
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
382 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
affirmations of Taiwan's trading partners that they have no intentions of
recognizing either Taiwan or its government, are little comfort. The PRC
remains concerned that a de facto situation is being created in which a
declaration of independence by Taiwan would be favorably met.
1. Airspace Agreements
Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines have all entered into agreements with either Taiwan's Civil
Aeronautics Administration or its state-owned China Airlines to fly directly
to Taiwan. 9 KLM Dutch Airlines has offered daily direct flights to
Taipei since 1983,10 despite Beijing's objection. 1 Both Australia and
New Zealand established direct flights without seeking approval from the
PRC.212 Russia and Vietnam did the same in 1993.213
These agreements illustrate the legal difficulties inherent in business
dealings with Taiwan. It is hard to imagine that the nations involved
consciously intended to imply anything about Taiwan's international status
when they set up their direct flights. Since Taiwan is a bustling commercial
destination, it is simply good business for airlines to have direct flights there.
However, under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, "every
State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over that airspace above its
territory.""' Establishing direct flights without the permission of the PRC
implies that these nations do not recognize the sovereignty of the PRC over
Taiwan's airspace. Since they contracted with the Taiwanese government,
it follows that these nations instead recognize its complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace of Taiwan. Under the terms of the Conven-
tion, only states have sovereignty over the air above them. Thus the
209. Annex: List of Bi-lateral Agreements, 10 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 243-45
(1990-1991). Most of the governments of these countries did not contract directly with Taiwan,
but they could scarcely be unaware of the agreements. Lebanon, Thailand and the Philippines
contracted through their state-owned airlines and Indonesia did it through its Chamber of
Commerce office in Taipei. Only the U.A.E. went through its Department of Civil Aviation.
Id.
210. Jacques Charmelot, Les Droits de l'Homme au Menu des Entretiens du Ministre
Ngerlandais des Affaires Etrangrs, Agence France Presse, Mar. 7, 1994 available in LEXIS,
News Library, PRESSE File. Other state-owned European carriers, such as Air France,
Lufthansa and British Airways opened flights to Taipei in 1993, but did so under subsidiary
companies. Id.
211. Id. See also PRC White Paper, supra note 12.
212. Nicholas D. Kristof, Taiwan, Winning New Friends, Hopes for Another One in
Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at A10.
213. Agreement on Mutual Cooperation in Civil Aviation, July 28, 1993, Taipei-Moscow
Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission-Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural
Commission, reprinted in 12 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 463 (1992-1994); Agreement on
the Promotion and Expansion of Air Services, Nov. 25, 1993, Taipei Airlines Association-
Airlines Association of Vietnam, reprinted in 12 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 535 (1992-
1994).
214. Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 61
Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 259, (entered into force Apr. 4, 1957) (emphasis added).
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conclusion of airspace agreements with a government whose jurisdiction
encompasses only the islands of Taiwan, might be held to imply an intent to
recognize Taiwan as a state.
As noted above, such actions would hardly be sufficiently unambiguous
to constitute implied recognition with all its legal consequences. However,
contracting with Taiwanese authorities to enter Taiwan's airspace does
contradict the official stance of the nations in question and as such, both
encourages the proponents of Taiwanese independence and angers the PRC.
2. Arms Sales
The more complex matter of arms sales to Taiwan could also be taken
to imply that the selling countries are willing to recognize Taiwan as a state.
In 1990, Taiwan unveiled a six-year, U.S.$300 billion public works
program.215 Many European and U.S. companies began competing for
construction contracts. 1 6 At the same time, Taiwan began to update its
military.217
Because many of the arms purchasers were retired military officers with
close ties to the KMT, 2  arms sales were seen by many countries as an
opportunity to improve their chances of being awarded the civilian con-
tracts. 2 9  For this reason, the governments of France, Germany, and the
United States gave defense contractors in their countries permission to sell
arms to Taiwan. 2 ° From 1990 to 1994, Taiwan spent U.S.$10 billion on
215. The program includes plans for a U.S.$7.4 billion nuclear power plant, a U.S.$13
billion highway, an U.S.$11 billion high speed railroad, and two mass-transit systems, one
worth U.S.$7.4 billion and one worth U.S.$6.2 billion. Jim Mann, Taiwan Arms Deals Open
Doors to Civilian Contracts, Targeting Taiwan for Arms Deals part 2, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1994, at Al [hereinafter Targeting, part 2].
216. In 1991, France sent a Cabinet-level minister to Taiwan at the head of a large delega-
tion. Id. In 1992, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills visited Taiwan. Id. She was the first
Cabinet-level official from the U.S. to do so since 1979. Id. Cabinet-level officials are not
officially allowed to visit Taiwan even under the new Clinton Administration policy. U.S.
Expands High-level Meetings with Taiwan, supra note 61. This did not stop Transportation
Secretary Federico Pena from visiting Taiwan in December 1994, however. Weinberger, supra
note 62, at 35.
217. Targeting, part 2, supra note 215.
218. Id.
219. After the U.S. sale of F-16s in 1992, officials and trade representatives were hopeful
that the sale would help U.S. firms get commercial contracts in Taiwan. Especially coveted was
the nuclear power plant contract. Targeting, part 2, supra note 215. The British government
remains detached from Taiwan, but British defense contractors have been looking into the
Taiwanese market, as have Italian and Russian firms and military officials. Jim Mann,
Targeting Taiwan for Arms Deals, part 1, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at Al [hereinafter
Targeting, part 1].
220. In France, lobbying by Dassault, the maker of the Mirage, resulted in top-level
ministers approving a change in France's long-standing policy of refusing to sell arms to
Taiwan. Targeting, part 1, supra note 219. The United States, under pressure from weapons
contractors, gave specific permission to sell only certain arms to Taiwan, thus carefully avoiding
abandoning its 1982 joint communiqud with China in which the United States promised to phase
out arms sales to Taiwan. Joint Communiqu6 on Taiwan, Aug. 17, 1982, U.S.-P.R.C., paras.
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Western weapons .221 These arms sales appear to be having the hoped-for
effect, resulting in civilian contracts for firms in those countries.
222
The PRC complained that the arms sales constituted illegal intervention
in its internal affairs.223 Beijing publicly retaliated against France on that
ground.24 It disqualified French firms from bidding on its Guangzhou
subway project after France sold Taiwan sixty Mirage fighters.' The
PRC also closed the French consulate in Guangzhou. 6  As a result,
France reversed course. In January 1994, France changed its policy and
issued a joint communiqu6 with the PRC "that in the future, it will refrain
from authorizing French businesses to participate in the arming of Tai-
wan. " 227 France is the only nation thus far to bring its actions in line with
its public statements. The United States and Germany have continued their
sales in increasingly inventive ways and with tacit governmental approv-
al.
228
International law forbids unlawful intervention by one state in another
state's internal affairs. 29 Intervention is defined as, "interference by one
state in the affairs of another for the purpose of either maintaining or
6, 21 I.L.M. 1147 [hereinafter Joint Communiqud]. The Communiqu6 tempered section
3301(b)(5) of the TRA, which states it is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan with
defensive arms. There was strong support in Congress to abandon the Communiqu6 altogether.
Jim Mann, U.S. Accord Clears Way for New Arms Sales to Taiwan, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1994,
at Al [hereinafter U.S. Accord Clears Way].
221. Targeting, part 1, supra note 219. France sold Taiwan six Lafayette-class light
frigates in 1991. Aprs des Fregates et des Mirage 2000, Taiwan Envisage d'Acheter des Garde-
COtes di la France, LE MONDE, Oct. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRESSE File
[hereinafter Aprs des Fregates]. In 1993, it sold 60 Mirage fighter jets and 1500 MICA air to
air missiles to Taiwan. Id. In 1992, the United States sold 150 F-16s to Taiwan. Targeting,
part 1, supra note 219. Germany sold Taiwan 10 submarines that year. Sophie Huet, Pas de
Sous-Marins Allemands a Taiwan, Affirme le Ministre Allenand des Affaires Etrangres, Agence
France Press, Apr. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRESSE File.
222. France's Matra was awarded the Taipei subway contract. Targeting, part 2, supra
note 215, at A6. Germany was optimistic about its prospects for selling high speed trains worth
U.S.$17 million to Taiwan. Huet, supra note 221. The bids for the nuclear power plant
contract were reviewed at the end of 1994 and the contract will be awarded in 1995. Taiwan
Seeks Nuclear Technology in Reactor Tender, The Reuter Asia-Pacific Business Report, Oct. 4,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUTER File.
223. PRC White Paper, supra note 12. The PRC has likened U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
to the British selling arms to the Confederacy. Washington Presence, supra note 61.
224. Targeting, part 2, supra note 215, at A6.
225. Id.
226. Kristof, supra note 212.
227. Targeting, part 2, supra note 215, at A6. This move was the result of lobbying by
French businesses doing business in the PRC. Id.
228. In response to PRC protests, the German government forbade the direct shipment of
submarines to Taiwan, but agreements between German shipyards and American firms have
resulted in agreements to ship disassembled submarines to the U.S. or South Korea, assemble
them there and transship them to Taiwan. Huet, supra note 221. South Korea switched
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1992 and adopted the Japanese formula. Unofficial
Missions, supra note 49, at 629.
229. VON GLAHN, supra note 118, at 162.
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changing the status quo. ""3 The purpose of the nations involved in arms
sales is arguably nothing more than to further their own trade interests in
Taiwan. In effect, however, selling arms to Taiwan does preserve the status
quo by maintaining a putative balance of power between Taiwan and the
PRC.23'
As these nations purport to recognize the PRC's claim to sovereignty
over Taiwan, selling arms to the KMT thus constitutes arming a rival
government within territory under PRC sovereignty. Looked at in this way,
the arms sales do, as the PRC suggests, constitute unlawful interference in
its internal affairs. 3l Since most states attempt to act within the bounds of
international law whenever possible, the PRC's interpretation is not illogical.
However, the PRC's objections to the recent arms sales must be under-
stood in the context of Taiwanese politics. Beijing sees the sales as
supporting and encouraging those who advocate independence or enhanced
recognition. Despite reassurances from the United States, Germany and
others that they recognize the PRC's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, their
actions continue to imply that they recognize the KMT's territorial authority
over the islands of Taiwan and its right to defend that territory. Beijing
knows that Taiwan believes that any aggression is most likely to come from
the mainland. 3  Nations selling arms to Taiwan are also aware of
this.234 Thus, if they mean what they say, the United States, France, and
Germany are in violation of international law; if they mean what can be
implied from their actions, they could be seen as supporting Taiwanese
independence or the divided state theory."3
V. CONCLUSION
Taiwan's trading partners are caught between Taiwan's burgeoning
230. Id. at 163.
231. U.S. Accord Clears Way, supra note 220, at Al.
232. While the PRC has said that it will allow Taiwan to keep its armed forces after
reunification, their strength and supply will presumably be controlled by Beijing. See PRC
White Paper, supra note 12.
233. Taiwan Defense Minister Warns of Chinese Threat, Reuters World Service, Aug. 31,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUTER File.
234. For example, the United States Joint Communiqu6 with the PRC which governs US-
PRC relations, makes the United States' reduction in arms sales to Taiwan contingent on
peaceful reunification. Joint Communique, supra note 220, paras. 5-6.
235. Arms sales are also not incompatible with the divided state theory. In 1987, two years
before the Berlin wall fell, West Germany imported U.S.$420 million worth of arms and East
Germany imported U.S.$220 million. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1988 85 tbl. II (1989). In 1991, the
year North and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations, those countries spent
U.S.$2.4 billion and U.S.$3 billion, respectively, on arms imports. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1991-1992,
12 (1994). See also Oh Kwan-chi, The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, in THE
KOREAN PENINSULA: PROSPECTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION UNDER GLOBAL DETENTE 91 (William
J. Taylor et al. eds., 1990).
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democracy and desire for international status, and the mainland's historical
claim to Taiwan as a part of the former Chinese empire. The unpredictabili-
ty of Taiwan's voters on one hand and the ambitions of those who would
succeed Deng Xiaoping as the PRC's preeminent leader on the other, make
this a precarious place to be.
Although it is highly unlikely that trading nations with unofficial ties to
Taiwan would acquire any legal duties toward Taiwan through implied
recognition, it is clear that in the overall context, actions speak louder than
words. By saying that they recognize the PRC's claim to Taiwan and at the
same time going ahead with trade arrangements like arms sales and airspace
agreements which imply support for statehood, Taiwan's trading partners are
aggravating the situation.
The DPP and the native Taiwanese within the KMT cannot help but be
encouraged in their efforts toward greater recognition and potential
independence by this attention. At the same time, the PRC cannot help but
be appalled at the seeming duplicity of those nations which say one thing and
do another. Were the DPP to gain the presidency in 1996 and, relying on
what it sees as widespread international support, ask for a referendum on
self-determination, the PRC could be provoked into action. Alternatively,
with Deng Xiaoping near death, there may come a time of instability in the
PRC's leadership which could lead to the rash decision to grab Taiwan
before it slips away.
If either of these scenarios occurs, the trading nations which have played
both sides of the fence for so long, will suddenly find themselves having to
chose between ignoring the Taiwanese people to whom they have lent their
implicit support, or breaking their word to the PRC that Taiwan's status is
the PRC's internal affair in which they will not intervene. Neither scenario
is appealing. Therefore, it is in the best interest of each nation involved with
Taiwan to decide which position it supports and clearly communicate that
position to both Taiwan and the PRC.
The divided state concept currently put forth by the KMT is potentially
the best compromise between the two extremes of province and state.
International recognition of the division of China at the Taiwan Straits would
make those Straits a frontier for purposes of the use of force and take the
issue of Taiwan out of Beijing's internal domain. At the same time, it would
create a stable framework in which the PRC and Taiwan could negotiate
toward reunification or some form of association over the long term. Taiwan
would be secure from attack in its enhanced international status and the PRC
would maintain its historical ties to Taiwan. Selling Beijing on this idea will
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be difficult, but an effort must be made to resolve the ambiguity of Taiwan's
status before either side tests the international waters.
Cheri Attix"
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